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Talk is cheap. Calling yourself the king of France will not replace
the Fifth Republic with a monarchy. Americans love to talk about,
extol, and announce their attachment to their Constitution. What, if
anything, they mean by all of that is an important question.
On the second day of the current session of Congress, members
of the House of Representatives went beyond talking about the
Constitution and actually read most of it.' One day earlier, the House
amended its rules to reflect a fundamental principle of the
Constitution: enumerated federal power. House bills must now
include a statement of the constitutional powers on which they rest.
These statements may turn out to be repetitive and little more
than cheap talk. Many of the statements likely will invoke Congress's
taxing power, about which there can be no question.' Many of them
likely will invoke a purported power to spend government money for
the common defense and general welfare, though the existence of such
a power is denied by a tradition going back to James Madison.' And
t

James Madison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
157 Cong Rec H 54-62 (daily ed Jan 6,2011).
2
HR Res 5, § 2, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec H 7 (Jan 5, 2011) (amending
Rule XII of the standing rules of the House of Representatives).
3
US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States.").
For the supposed source of the power to spend for the common defense and general
4
welfare, see US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1. The problem is that this clause, while drafted on the
assumption that tax revenue will be spent for the purposes described, is not formally a grant of
power to spend money for those purposes, or any other. Moreover, the reference to the common
defense and general welfare is in between a grant of power to tax and a limitation on that
power-the uniformity requirement-suggesting that it too is a qualification of the taxing power.
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many-probably most, possibly all-will invoke the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I, § 8. These statements raise the question
whether much of the federal government's substantive legislation is
based on an unduly broad reading of that clause and therefore
inconsistent with the Constitution.
The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause casts new light
on that question. Part I of this Review is about the Necessary and
Proper Clause, briefly reviewing its central role in contemporary
federal law and the recurring questions that arise in applying it. Part II
recounts the book's main arguments. Part III presents my views about
the soundness and implications of the inferences that the authors
draw from their evidence. Some of those inferences are more secure
than others, and those that are secure make an important contribution
to understanding the clause. Part IV discusses the broader questions
of constitutional substance and interpretation that must be resolved in
order to determine whether claims about the original textual meaning,
or textual meaning in any sense, matter for American constitutional
practice.
I. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE: CURRENT USE
AND CONTROVERSIES

A.

Congress's Reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause

The Constitution is overwhelmingly about power, and it contains
many grants thereof to Congress, the President, the federal courts, and
a few other recipients. Many of the powers of Congress are
enumerated in Article I, § 8, which concludes with the Necessary and
Proper Clause. This clause gives Congress the power "to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."s
That the Necessary and Proper Clause has become a central
source of congressional authority is well known.! For that reason I will
note only a few examples to illustrate the point. Probably the most
noteworthy are the many statutes adopted on the basis of the
congressional power to regulate commerce among the several states,
with foreign nations, and the Indian tribes, combined with the
An exposition of Madison's position and of the subsequent debate appears in United States v
Butler, 297 US 1, 65-69 (1936).
5
US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18.
6
See Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 1 Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw: Substance
and Procedure§ 3.2(a) at 340-41 (West 3d ed 1999).
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Necessary and Proper Clause. A common indication that the latter is
doing much or almost all of the work is that the statutes apply to
economic activity that is not commerce. The statutory sign of this is an
invocation of the regulated activity's effect on commerce, which is a
backhanded way of saying that the activity is not itself actually
commerce. If the conduct in question were actually commerce, it
would not be necessary to have the added category of conduct that
affects commerce. But regulating the latter category goes beyond the
regulation of commerce and so goes beyond the Commerce Clause
proper. Regulating conduct that is not commerce because it affects
commerce is legislating to carry into execution the power to regulate
commerce and so rests on the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the
Commerce Clause strictly speaking.
That is how the system of federal labor and employment law
operates. The National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA), which created
the system of collective bargaining overseen by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), rests on a congressional finding that refusal
to bargain collectively leads to strikes, which burden and obstruct
interstate commerce.! A similar rationale concerning effects on
commerce underlies major employment discrimination laws like the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' (CRA) and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Acto (ADEA). Congress likewise regulates workplace
safety through the Occupational Safety and Health Act" (OSHA) on
this basis, whether the workplace is one of commerce as opposed, for
example, to manufacturing. 2
Although the commerce power is perhaps the most discussed
primary congressional power that is linked to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it is of course not the only one. Indeed, it is quite
possible that every enumerated power on the list has some important
adjunct statute that is not based on a strict interpretation of that
Pub L No 74-198,49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq.
8 See 29 USC § 151.
9 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. The employment
discrimination provisions of the CRA apply to employers in industries affecting commerce,
42 USC § 2000e(b), which is a broader category than industries engaged in commerce.
10 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified at 29 USC § 621 et seq. The ADEA rests
on a congressional finding that age discrimination burdens commerce and the free flow of goods
in commerce. See 29 USC § 621(a)(4). As with the CRA, covered employers are defined as those

7

in industries affecting commerce. See 29 USC §630(b).
11 Pub L No 91-596,84 Stat 1590 (1970), codified at 29 USC § 651 et seq.
12 OSHA begins with a congressional finding that workplace injuries are a hindrance to
interstate commerce, see 29 USC § 651(a), followed by a statement of the purposes Congress is
pursuing through the regulation of commerce. See 29 USC § 651(b). But working in a
manufacturing facility is not, in general, commerce among the several states, although it may
affect that commerce.
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power. The federal statute that governs voting by members of the
military in presidential elections and requires that states provide them
with absentee ballots is one example." Ensuring military voting rights
is useful to raising an army but does not constitute doing so. Even
powers not on the main Article I list are sometimes implemented this
way. The criminal ban on unauthorized use of the character Smokey
Bear has its constitutional home in Congress's power over federal real
estate in Article IV of the Constitution.1
To say that the Necessary and Proper Clause is routinely used is
not to say that anything strange is going on. Of course Congress can
turn federal forests into national parks and allow camping. And of
course reminding campers to be careful with fire makes sense. And
preserving Smokey Bear's status as a national icon is an effective
means to this end. In contrast, the system of collective bargaining is a
major feature of American law, but its connection to the interstate sale
of goods is not nearly as close as Smokey Bear's connection to
preventing forest fires. This is what makes the clause not only
important, but problematic.
B.

Determining the Extent of the Clause's Reach

The Necessary and Proper Clause is about means-ends
connections. It authorizes Congress to pass laws in order to do
something. Usually, Congress is authorized to pursue some primary
goal by a provision of the Constitution other than the Necessary and
Proper Clause, frequently one of its other enumerated powers. Most
often, this primary goal is to further the policy of some statute that
Congress is empowered to adopt. For example, Congress can establish
post offices, the purpose of which is to handle the mail." A statute
making it a crime to set fire to a post office with the intent of
destroying the mail would further that purpose and therefore would
be a means to the end of distributing the mail." I will refer to purposes
like the safe distribution of the mail as primary goals, and statutes
adopted on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause as secondary

13 The main statutory provision governing state responsibilities is 42 USC § 1973ff-1. I use
its application to presidential elections as an example because Congress has separate powers
over the times, places, and manner of elections for the House and the Senate, but presidential
electors are to be chosen as determined by the state legislatures. Compare US Const Art I, § 4,
cl 1; US Const Amend XVII, § 2, with US Const Art II, § 1, cl 4.
14 See 18 USC § 711. As the statute sets out, Smokey Bear was created by the Forest
Service in the interest of preventing forest fires, especially in national forests.
15 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 7.
16 See 18 USC § 1705.
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rules." The main questions under the clause can be formulated in these
terms.
Perhaps the first such question is this: How strong must the
means-end connection between the primary policy and the secondary
rule be? That question in turn breaks down into two sub-questions,
which may be called the absolute and comparative versions. The
absolute version asks how much the secondary rule will advance the
primary goal. The more the secondary rule contributes to achieving
the primary goal, the stronger the argument that it is authorized by
the clause. Thus, a statute punishing perjury in federal judicial
proceedings pretty clearly makes a substantial contribution to the
courts' factfinding function, an aspect of the judicial power that
supplies a purpose under the clause." In similar fashion, a requirement
that a large part of the population buy health coverage may well go a
long way toward keeping health insurance companies solvent when
they are subject to requirements that cause them to take losses on
some of their contracts.1' By contrast, it is doubtful whether banning
guns in the vicinity of schools would make a contribution to the
quality of education so significant that it would also have an effect on
the country's economic production.20
Relative or comparative instrumental contributions may also
matter, depending on how one reads the clause. A secondary rule may
further the primary goal significantly, but there may be some other
secondary rule that would accomplish the same goal, as well as some
reason to prefer one to the other. For example, forbidding setting fire
to post offices and forbidding bringing combustible materials within
one hundred yards of a post office might be roughly equally effective
in protecting post offices from arson, but the latter has substantially
17 By setting up the issues this way, I am suppressing many complexities. One that is
important enough to note is whether one of Congress's primary powers can itself supply a
permissible goal, even if Congress has not exercised that power. A common ground for invoking
the necessary and proper power is Congress's power to maintain the free flow of interstate
commerce. See, for example, NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 23 (1937)
(justifying the NLRA on this basis). Certainly the commerce power enables Congress to regulate
interstate commerce per se for that purpose. It is doubtful, however, whether that purpose alone
will support action under the Necessary and Proper Clause if Congress has not enacted any
primary legislation under the commerce power itself. Justice Antonin Scalia raised this point in
Gonzalez v Raich, 545 US 1 (2005). In that case, it was important to him that the regulation of
intrastate activity at issue was in support of a rule about strictly interstate commerce that
Congress in fact had adopted, not just one that it could adopt if it wanted to. See id at 37-42
(Scalia concurring).
18 See 18 USC § 1621; United States v Williams, 341 US 58,68 (1951).
19 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(a), Pub L No 111-148,
124 Stat 119 (2010). But see Florida v US Department of Health and Human Services,
2011 WL 3519178, *66 (11th Cir).
20 See United States v Lopez,514 US 549,561 (1995).
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more collateral consequences for people's conduct than does the
former. If those collateral consequences matter, then it will be
important to compare secondary rules with one another.
When government power depends on the reason for which that
power is exercised, perhaps a distinction ought to be made between
real and pretextual reasons. It is one thing to say that a secondary rule
will further the primary goal but another to say that furthering that
goal in fact led the legislature to adopt the secondary rule. A
requirement that the instrumental connection actually be Congress's
reason could impose substantial limits on its power under the clause.
For example, the Supreme Court in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp" accepted the argument that more harmonious labor relations,
achieved through collective bargaining overseen by the NLRB, would
reduce strikes and other disruptions of production.22 Reducing
disruptions, in turn, would enable interstate commerce to flow more
freely, an end the Court accepted under the Commerce Clause
proper." Whether that causal connection existed, it is easy to imagine
that the protection of interstate commerce alone would not have led
Congress to enact such a far-reaching statute. Rather, a belief that the
rules of labor law in the NLRA were more just than those of the
existing law of contracts may have been crucial in leading Congress to
pass the Act. If concerns about interstate commerce were not enough
to motivate Congress, then those concerns were in an important sense
a pretext. The contention that a pretext does not satisfy the clause is at
least as old as Chief Justice John Marshall's statement to that effect in
M'Culloch v Maryland.24
Another question concerning means and ends is whether side
effects matter, and, if so, how. Here, a side effect is a consequence of
the secondary rule other than its advancement of the primary goal.
Common readings of the clause identify two particular kinds of side
effects as potentially important. One is the expansion of federal
power. Venerable readings of the clause hold that secondary rules
must not expand congressional authority too much, even if they
advance primary goals to an otherwise acceptable extent. One such
constraint is the requirement that the clause not completely overturn

301 US 1 (1937).
Id at 42.
23 Id at 41.
24
17 US (4 Wheat) 316,423 (1819) ("[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it,
to say that such an act was not the law of the land.").
21
22
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the principle of enumerated-and hence limited-federal power.
That consideration very likely drove the Court's attempt in United
States v Lopez2 to develop formal principles, which in that case
centered on the distinction between the economic and the
noneconomic, that would keep Congress from possessing plenary
legislative authority because of the clause.2
A more elaborate version of this principle is as old as the debate
itself Criticizing the legislation creating the First Bank of the United
States, James Madison argued that there is a difference in principle
between incidental powers, which can come through the Necessary
and Proper Clause, and "independent and substantive" powers, which
21
cannot. Madison maintained that chartering a banking corporation
was an example of the latter, because the power to create corporations
was such an important aspect of the sovereign prerogative.2 He was
also clear that if a power were independent and substantive, an
instrumental connection with a permitted primary goal was not
enough: neither implication nor the clause could supply such powers.
According to some readings, then, if a secondary rule has the
effect of unduly expanding federal power in general, or of exercising a
particular category of power, it may be beyond the clause, even if it
furthers a permissible goal. Hence, other effects matter insofar as they
consist of greater congressional authority.
The second category of side effects that is often thought
problematic covers consequences for individual rights, meaning
specified individual interests or legal advantages. Some readings of the
clause hold that a secondary rule is impermissible, without regard to
its instrumental value, if it interferes with particular choices or actions,
such as decisions that are important exercises of autonomy." Speech
and religion are natural examples, but it is important to see that this
principle may extend to other choices, so that such a limited view of
the necessary and proper power would not be redundant of the
affirmative limitations (not all of which were in place when the clause
was adopted). Decisions regarding healthcare may fall into this

See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495,529-30 (1935).
514 US 549 (1995).
27 See id at 560-61.
28 James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb 2, 1791), in Charles F. Hobson, et al, eds, 13 The
Papersof James Madison 372,375-79 (Virginia 1981).
29 See id at 378.
30 See id at 379.
31 A leading discussion of this possibility was coauthored by one of the book's authors,
Gary Lawson. See Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower:
A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L J 267,326-31 (1993).
2

26
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category, and they are not as such protected by any of the specific
enactments in favor of liberty of conduct.
None of the foregoing questions takes into account the institutional
structure of the government and the different perspectives of different
decisionmakers. Those perspectives raise another set of important
questions. Judgments about instrumental connections and other effects
are generally predictive questions of fact, and not questions of law. Yet,
a legal norm means that the extent of congressional power depends in
part on these judgments of fact, and so in some way brings them within
the purview of legal analysis.
This fact about the clause then must be taken into account in a
legal system in which governmental institutions other than the
legislature address constitutional questions. In particular, it must be
taken into account during judicial review, in which courts assess the
conformity of congressional statutes with the Constitution, on the
assumption that if the former do not square with the latter, then they
are to be disregarded as invalid. Judicial review is premised on the
assumption that, to a large extent, courts will decide constitutional
issues for themselves, and in particular that they are not absolutely
bound by any conclusions reached by Congress while legislating." But
while some degree of judicial independence is fundamental to judicial
review, judges and commentators have seriously considered the
possibility of some deference to the legislature since judicial review
was first practiced in this country.
It is unsurprising, then, that one standard candidate for a category
of legislative judgments to which courts should defer in constitutional
cases is that of the instrumental judgments that must be made under
32 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also City of Boerne v
Flores,521 US 507, 519-24 (1997).
33 See, for example, United Haulers Association, Inc v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, 550 US 330, 349 (2007) (Scalia concurring) ("Generally speaking, the
balancing of various values is left to Congress-which is precisely what the Commerce Clause
(the real Commerce Clause) envisions."); Whitman v American Trucking Associations,
531 US 457, 474-75 (2001) ("In short, we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing
or applying the law.") (quotation marks omitted); Chevron, USA., Inc v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837,843 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."). See also Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function,
69 Harv L Rev 217, 228-38 (1955). The argument that courts should give strong deference to
legislatures in deciding constitutional questions under American constitutions is older than the
Constitution itself, having been raised, for example, by St. George Tucker while arguing a 1782
case involving an attack on the constitutionality of a Virginia treason statute under Virginia. law.
See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review,
143 U Pa L Rev 491,527 (1994) (noting that Tucker believed a statute had to be "dramatically at
odds with the constitution" for it to be unconstitutional).
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the clause.' Considerations of comparative expertise may weigh in
favor of deference here. For example, Congress's job is to make policy
and, to effectively do so, it must develop the ability to predict the
probable consequences of various possible legislative measures.
Courts may have a hard time, for example, determining whether the
scale of federal borrowing calls for a national bank. Senators and
representatives with substantial experience in federal finance, by
contrast, may be in a very good position to answer that question. But a
constitutional system that places court-enforced limits on legislative
power is unlikely to have the judiciary defer completely to the
legislature even on factual questions, because to do so would
substantially take back the decision to limit the legislature with rules
enforced in part through the courts. The appropriate degree of
deference has become another important question in the application
of the clause, because with a provision that is fundamentally about
factual questions of means and ends, deference on policy and factual
judgments can have an effect that is practically very similar to an
expansion of federal power.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER CLAUSE
Even those who disagree about the exact significance of the
Constitution's history generally agree that it is important. That history
includes not only the document's framing and ratification but also the
background of its concepts and institutions. To understand the judicial
power conferred by Article III, it is common to look to the practices
of the English courts that were known to the Framers." It is also a
standard, though controversial, move to look to the King's authority in
understanding the President's authority, and specifically in
understanding the executive power referred to in Article I.
It may be surprising, then, that the historical antecedents of the
Necessary and Proper Clause have not been much investigated,
despite that clause's centrality. To explain that gap, one might theorize

3
See Lopez, 514 US at 616 (Breyer dissenting) ("Courts must give Congress a degree of
leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce.").
35 See, for example, Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter dissenting)
("Judicial power [under Article III] could come into play only in matters that were the
traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert
feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies."').
36
A leading example is Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive
Powerover ForeignAffairs,111 Yale L J 231,265-72 (2001).
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that the clause's great expansion from the 1930s to the 1960s17
coincided with a lack of interest in history among judges and
commentators. But the clause has been a constitutional crux since the
very beginning, and courts and scholars hardly ignored history while
the clause's role was growing. A more likely, or at least partial,
explanation is that the clause has no obvious antecedents because the
governmental structure in which it operates has no obvious
antecedents. The Federal Convention largely invented constitutional
federalism, the accompanying principle of limited federal power, and
the particular implementation of that principle through a specific
enumeration of authority. As the clause is one further piece in that
larger and largely novel system, one might think that it has no
historical sources in any interesting respect.
One would be wrong. The authors' large claim is that the
terminology of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the concepts
that have become familiar in interpreting it, have proximate roots in
three bodies of eighteenth century Anglo-American law (pp 4-8).
They do not assert that the specific words of the clause had a wellunderstood and reasonably determinate legal meaning, but they do
say that the arrangement the Constitution establishes through those
words is quite similar to other legal arrangements that were well
known to the framers and other legally sophisticated Americans of
their time (pp 4-5). These arrangements are the private law of
fiduciaries, the public law of subordinate governmental bodies, and the
combined public and private law of corporations (p 8). In all of these
contexts, they say, it was common to invest someone with particular
authority and then with further power to exercise the primary
authority, where the contours of the further power were not specified.
These contours were, however, often identified by the words
"necessary and proper" and their cognates and relatives. This aspect of
these bodies of law, they say, is the Necessary and Proper Clause's
immediate historical source (pp 4-8).
A.

Fiduciary Law

Chapters 4 and 5, principally the work of Professor Robert
Natelson, trace the affinities between the private law of fiduciariesand specifically grants of power to fiduciaries to act for their
principals -and the Constitution. Professor Natelson argues that it is
natural to see such connections, because the Framers, following a long
line of tradition, regarded governmental authorities as trustees or
37 See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Tex L Rev 795,
807-08 (1996).
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fiduciaries or otherwise acting on behalf of the people (pp 52-57). He
then takes up and treats at length the feature of the private law most
relevant to the clause: a distinction between principal and incidental
grants. The general principle, applicable but not limited to grants of
authority, was that giving the principal brought with it the incidental.
For example, a conveyance of a parcel of land could implicitly bring
with it another real-property interest required to make the conveyed
interest useful, so that a lord of the manor granting land was assumed
to give along with it the right to graze livestock on the lord's unfenced
pasture (p 64).
In general, Natelson says, when a principal right or power was
given, incidental rights or powers came with it automatically by legal
implication. But not everyone would know about that implication, so
some drafters made the point explicit.' Natelson identifies three
different ways of formulating a clause that would confirm that
incidental powers came with principal powers (pp 72-78)." The word
"necessary" and cognates like "needful" figured frequently in such
grants (pp 74-78). Sometimes the actual constitutional language,
"necessary and proper," appeared." According to Natelson, the
conjunctive formulation meant that the grantee was being subjected
to two distinct standards, so that the grantee's action must be both
necessary and proper (pp 77-78). "Proper" was not just another way
of saying useful, but rather meant "in conformity with applicable
norms," which in private law delegations generally meant the norms
applicable to fiduciaries (pp 78-80).
Chapter 5 then deals specifically with the Constitution. In it,
Professor Natelson argues that the Federal Convention used the
conceptual tools and terminology of principal grants with explicit
incidental accompaniments in drafting the Necessary and Proper
Clause (pp 87-93). " The word "necessary," Natelson argues, "was
38 "One might reasonably ask why, if incidental powers tacitly accompanied a grant," a
drafter would include a clause providing for them explicitly (p 76). Natelson cites Lord Coke for
the answer that an abundance of caution is useful in drafting for laymen who may not be familiar
with what the law requires (pp 76-77).
39 He lists five kinds of additional-powers clauses, but the first two go beyond confirming
the availability of incidental powers (pp 72-74).
40 See, for example, John Earl of Buckingham v Drury, 1 Eng Rep 1454, 1462 (HL 1762);
West v Erisey, 1 Eng Rep 530,536 (HL 1727).
41 He provides a quite circumstantial account of the work of the Convention's Committee
of Detail, which produced the phrase "necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers" (p 89). But while there are records of the Federal Convention's debates, albeit
unofficial and incomplete, there are no such records for the committees, including the
Committee of Detail. I have not sought to determine from the available evidence whether his
particular claims about who did what and in what order in the Committee of Detail's
proceedings are correct. I will note that Natelson is not averse to speculating about unrecorded
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inserted into the proposed Constitution to communicate that
Congress would enjoy incidental powers. The separate insertion of the
word 'proper' strongly suggests it had a meaning separate from
necessary, and almost certainly a restrictive one" (p 93).
He then turns to the debate over ratification, in which the AntiFederalists made the clause an important part of their argument that
the Constitution would lead to consolidation and despotism, with an
omnicompetent national government displacing the states and
oppressing the people (pp 94-96). The Federalists denied the charge
both generally and as to the clause particularly. They maintained that
the clause gave only those powers that were incidental to the primary
grants elsewhere in the Constitution, and sometimes argued that the
clause was just a rule of construction clarifying that incidental powers
were available (pp 97-108).42 Natelson also argues that the ratification
process provides "some support" for the claim that legislation is
"proper" under the clause only if it complies with fiduciary obligations
(p 108). After canvassing ratification, he discusses the well-known
debate-which centered on the clause-about whether Congress
could create the First Bank of the United States. He is struck by the
broad agreement (which did not include Alexander Hamilton) about
the basic principle that the clause conferred only incidental power,
and that an incidental power had to be in some way less significant
than the primary power that it served (pp 115-17).
Natelson concludes by drawing out two leading points. First, the
clause grants or confirms only incidental powers, and "[t]o be
incidental, a power had to be lesser in importance to the principal power"
(p 119). "To be 'proper,' a law had to be, at the least, in compliance
with the fiduciary duties expected of all public officials" (p 119).

exchanges between members of the Convention. At one point, for example, he suggests that
Pierce Butler prepared, but did not actually introduce, a motion to remove the word "proper"
because "someone pointed out to [him] that the effect of the word 'proper' was to confine rather
than expand the scope of congressional authority-and Butler was an advocate of limiting the
federal government to enumerated powers" (p 91), citing Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the
FederalConvention of 1787 236 (Yale rev ed 1931). Could be.
42 For example, James Wilson made the point that the clause was subordinate to the main
enumeration (pp 97-98), and Oliver Ellsworth, the second chief justice, indicated that it just
clarified what would have been the case anyway (pp 98-99). Madison and Alexander Hamilton
both made the latter point writing as Publius (pp 99-101). "[T]he Federalists asserted that the
Necessary and Proper Clause had no substantive effect, but was merely a recital of the incidental
powers doctrine" (p 107).
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Reasonableness in Eighteenth-Century Administrative Law and
the Constitution

Gary Lawson, a leading scholar of administrative law and
constitutional structure, and Guy Seidman are the principal authors of a
chapter on the administrative law roots of the clause.43 In the eighteenthcentury British law of public administration, they identify principles of
reasonableness that "required delegated power to be exercised with
impartiality, efficacy, proportionality, and regard for people's rights" and
argue that these principles can be found in the clause (pp 120-21).
Their argument begins by finding these principles in preexisting
legal practice concerning parliamentary grants of discretion to
executive bodies and officials. These grants generally concerned
quite practical undertakings, like building sewers and paving streets
(pp 122-25). The common law courts found Parliament's authorizations
an implicit requirement that discretion be exercised on reasonable
grounds and so did not permit implementing authorities to impose
grossly different impositions on different affected individuals or
subject them to inconveniences quite out of proportion to the good being
accomplished (pp 122-25).
Lawson and Seidman then present a mainly structural argument
for the conclusion that the Necessary and Proper Clause incorporates
those principles of reasonableness. This argument begins not with
Congress and its powers, but with the other two great types of
constitutional power, executive and judicial. The exercise of both, they
say, involves some discretion. Courts must at least choose
decisionmaking methods, and the executive must choose the means to
the ends given it by law." They take it as obvious that those powers
must be exercised in a reasonable fashion. Although "[t]here is nothing
in Article III that expressly says that judges must decide cases rationally
or sensibly" (p 132), surely they must do so. In similar fashion, they take
it as given that the executive must perform its function rationally and
not, for example, by consulting the stars (pp 132-33). But neither
Article II nor Article III says in so many words that the powers granted

43 They are also the principal authors of two chapters, which I will not treat in detail,
regarding eighteenth-century British statutes and British and American legal drafting
(pp 13-51). Their conclusions are largely negative: there is not much to learn about the clause
from those seemingly promising but ultimately uninformative bodies of legal practice
(pp 50-51).
44 Because the judicial power "includes at least that power (and duty) to adopt decisionmaking methodologies," Article III "implicitly grants to federal courts discretionary authority to
structure their process of judicial decision-making" (p 131). As for Article II, "a grant of the lawexecuting executive power carries with it the implied ancillary power to choose means to
accomplish executive ends" (p 131).
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must be used sensibly. The requirement of reasonableness in using
conferred power is just taken for granted, so the Constitution assumes
that such principles apply when power is granted, or at least when
judicial or executive power is granted (p 133).
While that would have been obvious in late eighteenth-century
America, it may not have been so obvious that the legislature was
subject to principles of reasonableness. The cases enunciating the
reasonableness requirement in England were interpreting
parliamentary grants of power, not the power of the legislature itself
(p 134). In the British system, the legislative power was supreme,
superior to the executive and the courts and not itself subject to law
(pp 134-35). A fundamental feature of American constitutional law is
that Congress is not Parliament. It is bound by the Constitution and
coequal with, not superior to, the executive and the judiciary (p 135).
But such was the power of the British model, and the drafters of the
Constitution might have been concerned that not everyone would see
the disanalogies among the strong analogies between the two
legislatures (p 135).41 "Accordingly, it would make sense to specify a
constitutional constraint on Congress's discretionary powers, if and
when such a constraint was desired. The Necessary and Proper Clause
is a sensible, and even obvious, place for such a constraint" (p 135).
According to the authors, the clause thus makes explicit not one
but two points that could have gone without saying: Congress has
incidental powers of implementation, and these powers are subject to
the principle of reasonableness. These two points render the principle
of reasonableness central, so Lawson and Seidman then elaborate on
it. Drawing on eighteenth-century cases, they identify four
requirements. First, the implementing law must not draw unjustified
distinctions among the people subject to it, and so it must be impartial
(pp 137-38). Second, it must be causally connected to the primary goal
by way of advancing that goal (p 139). Third, the means must be
commensurate with, or proportional to, the end being achieved
(pp 140-41). And finally, in a legal system that cherishes private rights,
reasonable exercise of implementing powers would respect those
rights (p 141). They then conclude by explaining how the particular
words of the clause capture those principles (pp 141-43).
45 Indeed, one profound but idiosyncratic student of the American Constitution did
conclude that the similarities were greater than the differences, maintaining that the Constitution
does not create a system of enumerated powers at all but rather grants Congress general
legislative authority. See William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politicsand the Constitution in the History
of the United States 509 (Chicago 1953). It is no surprise that William Crosskey, in discussing the
Necessary and Proper Clause, characterized Congress in terms most commentators would think
more appropriate for Parliament, as a "sovereign legislature." Id at 559.
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Chapter 7, written by Professor Geoffrey Miller, a leading scholar
of corporate law and its history, deals with the corporate law
background of the clause. Again, the analysis begins with the
observation that the words "necessary" and "proper" were "ubiquitous
in corporate practice" in preframing Anglo-American law (p 145).6 He
begins by noting that the Constitution itself is not simply like a
corporate charter; it is a corporate charter. It establishes a distinct legal
entity, sets out the purposes and powers of that entity, imposes limits on
those powers, grants exclusive rights and privileges, and provides for the
authority of agents and rules of governance (p 147). Furthermore, given
the legal background of the Federal Convention's members, there is
''every reason to suppose the members of the Committee of Detail who
drafted the Necessary and Proper Clause, in particular, were aware of
this corporate law background" (p 149).
Miller then describes his systematic inquiry, in which he read a
substantial sample of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century corporate
charters." From that sample he draws a large number of examples,
showing that "necessary" and "proper" and words very much like
them were very commonly used (pp 152-54).48 Miller then sets out six
conclusions. First, charter clauses like the Necessary and Proper
Clause conveyed ancillary, not independent, authority (p 155). Second,
the clause does not confer general legislative power on Congress,
because its analogues did not confer general power (p 156). Third,
while some charters made their grantees the judges of their own
power, the Constitution does not give Congress "unilateral discretion
to define whether a given action is within its legislative power"
(p 156)." Next, corporate clauses similar to the Necessary and Proper
Clause sometimes employed, by way of emphasis, "doublets," pairs of
words that are more or less synonyms. Hence, it is not sound to infer
from the fact that there are two words that "necessary" and "proper"
46 Professor Miller is careful to match his conclusions to his evidence, noting that "necessary"
and "proper" were not defined terms at the time, and their usage was not uniform (p 145).
47
Miller's sample consisted of a number of well-known charters-those of the First and
Second Banks of the United States, the American colonies, and the Massachusetts Bay Companyas well as all of the charters issued by two states, Connecticut and North Carolina. He chose these
two states in an attempt to avoid bias, on the grounds that they had substantially different
economies and, as a result, different types of corporations seeking charters (pp 149-50).
48 Those words generally appeared in "scope clauses' which clarify the purposes and
powers set out elsewhere (pp 150-52).
49 Miller contrasts the Constitution with charters that, for example, authorized the delegees
to take such steps as they might "deem" or "think" to be necessary, proper, convenient, and so
forth (pp 156-59). Congress is given power, not to do what it thinks necessary and proper, but
what is necessary and proper.
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impose independent limitations (pp 159-60).so Fifth, a careful
comparison of "necessary" with similar words in corporate charters
shows that the clause's language is relatively demanding as to the
instrumental connection between the subordinate and the primary
power. In order to be necessary, an implementing step had to be
"reasonably closely adapted to achieving the goals for which the
institution was formed" (p 171). Finally, in charters that use the word
"proper" to perform a distinctive role, the term generally controlled
corporate powers with respect to corporate stakeholders such as
shareholders. The implication is that, even if a law is necessary, it
might be beyond congressional power if, "without adequate
justification, it discriminates against or disproportionately affects the
interests of individual citizens vis- -vis others" (p 174)." He concludes
with the cautionary observation that inference from corporate
practice to the Constitution is plausible but not conclusively shown to
be correct (pp 175-76).
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CLAUSE'S BACKGROUND

A. General Principles Governing Incidental Power
In a way, tracing the Necessary and Proper Clause to multiple
bodies of law both weakens and strengthens the conclusions that can
be drawn from knowledge of the clause's antecedents.
They are weaker because several areas of law, and not just one,
constitute the background. Legal usage develops terms of art, words,
and phrases that have a specific, reasonably well-understood meaning
that is different from the ordinary, nontechnical meaning of the words.
"Equity" is an example. In its everyday usage, it means justice or doing
justice. But in the English legal system it referred to a court with a
body of jurisdictional, procedural, remedial, and substantive rules all
its own. When Article III refers to cases at equity, it means the kind of
cases that would come before the High Court of Chancery, not cases
in which the court sought to do justice. If the words "necessary and
proper" had been a term of art, then it would be reasonable to
conclude that the Constitution uses the words in that sense, provided
that the requirements of the applicable interpretive theory were met.
50 Miller's coauthors all conclude that the requirement that laws be "proper" means
something other than that they be "necessary" (pp 91, 141-43). Their conclusions are, in a strict
sense, consistent with Miller's, who rejects one particular line of inference to those conclusions,
but on this point the book's authors are not in complete harmony.
51 Miller puts this point somewhat hesitantly, perhaps because of his prior observation that
"proper"may be part of a doublet and hence cumulative of "necessary." See text accompanying
note 50.
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For example, Lawson would say that if knowledgeable users of
English in the United States in the late 1780s were generally familiar
with the fact that "necessary and proper" had a technical meaning, the
way that "equity" does, then that technical usage is part of the
document's original public meaning and hence part of its authoritative
meaning today.52 But because the phrase was used in similar ways in
more than one legal context, the task of showing that it had a single,
relatively determinate meaning is more difficult. For one thing, the
argument must deal with whether the fields of agency, public
administration, and corporations, while similar, are similar enough to
have used a common term of art despite their differences. To make the
argument work, other areas of law in which the same problem and the
same words arose must also be surveyed.
The authors do not say that the words "necessary and proper"
had become a term of art that was used uniformly in the three fields
that they discuss. Rather, they regard the multiple sources and
meanings of the clause as a strength of their argument and not a
weakness. They show that lawmakers, faced with similar problems,
resolved them in basically the same way and expressed that resolution
in language quite close to that of the Constitution. The problem was
always how to define the authority of a delegee-be it an agent, a
public body, or a corporation-so that it would go far enough, but not
too far, within the constraints of foresight and language. The answer
was to enumerate primary grants of authority and to either imply or
make explicit subsidiary authority derived from and closely connected
to those grants. This way, the delegating party would not need the
complete foresight otherwise required to explicitly identify all
possible grants of authority.
This evidence enables the authors to claim that they have
identified not a term of art but generally applicable principles that
reasonable rulemakers, past or present, adopt when they face a
particular problem (pp 7-8). The Constitution's system of enumerated
powers, they suggest, is one instance of this problem. It is an attempt
to give a legal actor limited powers that will be fully effective while
remaining limited, and to do so in a brief document. Faced with a task
similar to that of those who granted power to agents, government
bodies, and corporations in Britain, the Framers devised a similar
solution and reached for words frequently used to describe it.
Truly general principles are important because they can be
attributed either to actual lawmakers or the hypothetical rational
52 See Gary Lawson and Guy I. Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const
Comment 47,76-80 (2006).
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lawmaker posited by many textualists. But their generality often means
that their particular implementation will depend on the context.
General principles are like ordinary language as opposed to terms of
art; whereas the latter, by design, apply with fixed meaning in every
context, the former adapts to the particular circumstances in which it is
used. Just as principles of means-end rationality will work a bit
differently for private fiduciaries as opposed to public or semipublic
corporations, so they will apply differently to the legislature of a
compound republic as opposed to an administrative agency.
I raise this point not only because it is generally important, but
because I think it says something about one of the authors' specific
claims. Professor Miller contrasts implementing-power clauses in
corporate charters, some that did and others that did not incorporate
deference to the judgment of corporate decisionmakers. He
distinguishes charters that, for example, gave authority to corporate
decisionmakers to do what they deemed necessary from those that
gave authority to do what was necessary with no built-in discretion
(pp 156-59). The Necessary and Proper Clause is in the latter category,
and so the corporate background suggests that it does not give
Congress the additional deference that would apply if it were told to
implement its own views as to necessity and propriety.
That argument is sound insofar as it is about the clause itself. But
in the context of the Constitution, one branch of government
(Congress) decides which laws to enact, and other branches
(especially the courts) sometimes must decide whether those laws are
valid. It is common for officers of those other branches to say, and
perhaps even to mean, that they should give deference to a coordinate
part of the government on the great and delicate issue of
constitutional interpretation. That rationale for deference is not
related to the specifics of the Necessary and Proper Clause. It
probably would not have operated for an eighteenth-century
corporation, but the new system of government created by the
Constitution used familiar pieces to create a whole that was without
precedent. The system created by the Constitution is a novel context
in which basic ideas may manifest themselves in distinctive ways.
This aspect of the argument has another strength, but I will put
off describing it, both because it fits better with a later topic and to
maintain narrative suspense.
B.

Does the Necessary and Proper Clause Protect Liberty
and Equality?

Lawson and Seidman, along with Miller, say-and Natelson
indicates-that the clause has some requirement of impartiality.
Fiduciaries, public authorities, and corporations were all generally
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required to give equal treatment to members of some important
group, be it beneficiaries, the public, or stakeholders. Impartiality, as
well as its close relative, nondiscrimination with respect to specified
characteristics, is central to American constitutional law. The
Constitution contains explicit antidiscrimination provisions, such as
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, and two provisions that
are often read as general requirements of impartiality, the Equal
Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment." According to Justice John Paul Stevens, the supposed
antidiscrimination principles in the Equal Protection Clause are really
just manifestations of a more general requirement imposed by the
clause that the government govern impartially in the interest of
everyone it rules.9 If this sounds like the kind of general impartiality
requirement the authors are talking about, it should, because they are
almost certainly the same.
The presence or absence of a general requirement that the
federal government act impartially is a question of great importance.
If, like the Supreme Court, one readily moves from such a general
requirement to more particular rules against discrimination on
identified bases like race, then its importance may even increase.
These days, the Court finds a general requirement of equality, as well
as more specific limitations on discrimination, in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." This has produced much criticism

53 The Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments forbid discrimination on specified grounds
with respect to a specified legal advantage, the right to vote. See US Const Amend XV
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude);
US Const Amend XIX (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex). The Equal Protection
Clause says that no one shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, US Const Amend XIV,
§ 1, and so is formulated as a requirement that everyone be treated the same with respect to a
specified legal entitlement, the protection of the laws. According to the equality-based reading of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by forbidding states from
abridging privileges or immunities, it requires that all citizens have the same version of the legal
entitlements that fall into that category. The equality-based reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was rediscovered by David P. Currie in The Constitution in the Supreme
Court:The FirstHundred Yearys 1789-1888 347-51 (Chicago 1985) (arguing that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was designed to put into the Constitution the antidiscrimination rule of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866).
54 See Craig v Boren, 429 US 190,211-12 (1976) (Stevens concurring) ("There is only one
Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the
courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.").
55 The Equal Protection Clause does not mention race, but the Court says that it implies a
very demanding requirement of justification when the government discriminates on the basis of
race. See, for example, Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No 1,
551 US 701,720 (2007).
56 The main source of the contemporary doctrine is Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954),
which held that school segregation in the District of Columbia, a jurisdiction subject to the
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and various attempts at rehabilitation." It would be quite important to
discover that, as Lawson and Seidman say, the Court has been digging
in the wrong place, and the Necessary and Proper Clause incorporates
broad principles of equal treatment. Given the importance of the
clause, such a discovery would have large implications.
Whether the authors' evidence supports such a conclusion,
however, is doubtful. In particular, I think they have not demonstrated
that prior practice included an independent requirement of
impartiality, different from the one derived from the more
fundamental requirement of instrumental fit. Consider the example
that Lawson and Seidman use of a commission that charged one
landowner more than others, even though the expense related to that
one was not disproportionately high. The differential treatment there
was not related to the purpose of the commission (pp 137-38). None
of the authors presents evidence that a distinction that was related to
the primary goal would have been thought to be beyond incidental
powers, or even subject to what we would call especially strong
scrutiny. Rather, impartiality seems to have been just a side effect of
requiring a means-end match and the fact that some partial rules do
not match. But almost invariably, the kinds of distinctions in federal
law that raise concerns about impartiality are defended on the
grounds that they are connected to Congress's legitimate goals. In
Metro Broadcasting,Inc v FCC," for example, preferences for minority
owners of broadcast stations were justified with the argument that the
preferences would lead to better broadcasting services for the public,
no doubt a permissible goal." In the absence of a higher-than-normal
standard of justification, the preferences almost certainly would have
passed muster, as do most of Congress's debatable choices.
Much the same is true with respect to Lawson and Seidman's
suggestion that exercises of incidental powers must be rights
respecting. Here, too, I think that what looks like an independent
limitation is really an aspect of the requirement that the means be
adapted to the end, and perhaps that they be proportional as well. As
the cases about public authorities demonstrate, in the eighteenth
century, rights of private property were the central instance of rights
protected by the law. A well-adapted incidental rule may interfere
power of Congress and not of any state, is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which forbids arbitrary classifications. Id at 500.
5
For a discussion of the controversy over Bolling and the case's place in constitutional
debate, see Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its ProperPlace in the ConstitutionalCanon: Bolling v. Sharpe,
Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 Va L
Rev 1879,1897 (2006).
58 497 US 547 (1990).
59 See id at 552-55.
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with those rights. Congress can give census takers reasonable and
limited access to private property to determine how many people live
in a dwelling, and it can modify rights of liberty by requiring that
individuals answer truthfully questions concerning their place of
residence, so that the United States can determine the population of
each state for apportionment purposes.0 It may be that Congress
could not authorize census takers to inspect dwellings in the middle of
the night, but, if so, that is because the annoyance would be out of
proportion to the gain in census accuracy. Rights yield to reasonable
regulation unless they are protected by a rule under which they trump
an otherwise permissible exercise of power. This is a fundamental
feature of the Constitution: grants of power to the national
government are subject to affirmative limitations, and the affirmative
limitations go beyond the restrictions imposed by the principle of
enumerated federal power.
This feature of the system is illustrated by the kind of legal
interest that is perhaps more likely to be thought of as a right today
than ordinary private property rights or the general liberty to do what
one likes. The unamended Constitution, for example, authorized
Congress to restrict or eliminate an interest well known to and much
cherished by Americans, an interest so important that the Constitution
came to call it a right: the civil jury." In the Federal Convention's draft,
Congress was free to decide when jury trials would be available in the
federal courts. That discretion came from the so-called horizontal
Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress power to carry
into execution the judicial and executive powers. For example, laws
that determine the mode of trial carry the judicial power into
execution. Anti-Federalists made heavy weather of this aspect of the
plan, and the Seventh Amendment soon changed it, preserving the
right to jury trial in suits at common law." Before that, Congress had
the power to override the right to a civil jury, provided it did so in
60
Adults are required to answer truthfully the questions posed to them by census takers,
see 13 USC § 221, and owners of apartment buildings, among others, are required to give access
to their premises to census takers, see 13 USC § 223.The inquiries that must be answered may be
more extensive than one might think. For example, in order to implement § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress may have a census taker ask an individual's age, sex, and citizenship. (The
implication is that there is nothing special about imposing an affirmative duty under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.)
61 The Seventh Amendment preserves "the right of trial by jury" in specified civil cases. US
Const Amend VII.
62 John Marshall is reported to have responded, in the Virginia ratifying convention, to the
objection that the Constitution did not secure the civil jury trial, by arguing that the civil jury was
not excluded but permitted and that Congress would provide for it when to do so was expedient,
just as Virginia did. John Marshall, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in Herbert A.
Johnson, et al, eds, 1 The Papersof John Marshall275,285 (North Carolina 1974).
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accordance with principles governing the clause, that is, principles of
means-end adaptation and possibly proportionality. A rule
eliminating the civil jury in complex patent cases almost certainly
would have satisfied both requirements, for instance.
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Principle of
Enumerated Powers
If I am right that the history of the clause, as the authors present
it, does not go very far toward incorporating into it the most familiar
forms of affirmative limitations on power-nondiscrimination and
rights of liberty-then there remains the possibility that the clause
nevertheless is integral to the form of limitation on government that
the Federal Convention, at least, thought to be more fundamental:
enumerated federal power. Here I think the authors make a strong
case that the Necessary and Proper Clause is importantly limited in
the incidental powers it authorizes, which raises the possibility that the
country's current constitutional practice is seriously out of step with
the Constitution's original meaning.
The authors do not fully synthesize into a more unified
understanding of incidental powers the conclusions they draw, but I
think they point the way fairly clearly. Professor Natelson gives good
reason to believe that the clause was inserted out of caution (pp 94-119)
and confirms what would otherwise be true: a main power brings its
incidents with it (pp 60-67). The negative implication is that it brings
only its incidents with it. Professor Miller's work on corporate charters
reinforces this view, indicating that grants similar to this one created
incidental, and not independent, power (pp 144-55). And Professors
Lawson and Seidmen argue, although to me a bit less convincingly,
that the clause may even have been useful to make clear that
Congress's constitutional powers should be understood on the
assumption that the legislature is the sovereign's agent and delegee,
just like the executive and the judiciary, and not the sovereign itself,
the way Parliament was (pp 126-44)." All of the authors agree that the
63 Professor Lawson and I are both scholars of separation of powers who believe that the
fine details of the constitutional structure are very important, so any disagreement between us
may seem to the reader like differing counts of angels on pinheads. With that warning in place, I
will differ with him and Professor Seidman on this point. They argue that the executive and
judiciary are required to exercise their discretion in sensible ways only because they are subject
to an assumed principle of reasonableness, also found in (and perhaps derived from) eighteenthcentury administrative law. But given the similarity between Congress and Parliament, a
sophisticated reader might wonder whether similar limitations apply to the Constitution's
legislature. The clause clarifies that they do, and so in effect it is a limitation as much as, or more
than, it is a grant (pp 126-36). My hesitation comes when a reasonableness requirement for the
executive and the judiciary is attributed to generally accepted principles of administrative law. I
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clause originally served as a clarification that Congress has (or has
only) incidental powers, not as an additional grant.
This is powerful stuff It accomplishes what the Tenth
Amendment may have been designed, but fails, to do through its text:
underline that the principle of enumerated powers is to be taken
seriously and that the exercises of the explicitly granted powers are
supposed to be Congress's main business.6' First, rational drafters do
"not ... hide elephants in mouseholes." 6 They make their main points
explicitly and in primary statements, leaving only lesser matters to
implication or follow-up statements. One reason for this is that they
are most concerned with the main points and so spend more effort in
making sure that these points are included and correctly articulated.
Showing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is just a compendious
way of attaching secondary and incidental powers to every grant of
power reinforces the point that the primary grants are indeed primary
and the main focus of the drafters' concern.
Second, the authors' interpretation of the clause helps show that
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to the

Constitution's enumeration of powers. Expressio unius is about lists. It
operates when a list is implicitly exclusive. Some lists are, some lists
are not. The latter often are intended to make sure that some items
are included, rather than to exclude anything else. Careful drafters
sometimes preface such a list with a phrase like "including but not
limited to." The Necessary and Proper Clause shows that the
Constitution's drafters considered the possibility that the list might
not be adequate. With this in mind, they did not add, "and anything
else that would be useful for Congress to be able to do," or any clause
along those lines. Rather, they clarified the point about incidental
find reasonableness to be built into the powers conceptually. The judicial power is the power to
decide cases according to law and not to go off on unrelated frolics in the process. The executive
power is the authority to carry out the law, and so it, too, has an inherent requirement that
executive actions be connected to the law being carried out. Moreover, I think the discretion that
inevitably comes with either power is more limited than Lawson and Seidman do. For example, I
do not believe that the courts have the "power (and duty) to adopt decision-making
methodologies" (p 131), if that means to adopt them in the sense that Congress may adopt a tax
rate, choosing it to achieve the legislature's conception of the public good. I think that the courts
must identify methodologies, but that they are under substantial constraint in doing so. To some
extent, the methodologies are given to them as unwritten law that they both shape and are
bound by, and when they are shaping the unwritten law here they are supposed to do so in
pursuit of goals that are given to them, most importantly that of properly discovering the law and
the facts of the cases they decide.
6
The problem with the Tenth Amendment is that, as the Supreme Court sometimes has, it
can reasonably be read as just a tautology and hence only a reminder. See, for example, United
States v Darby,312 US 100, 124 (1940) (holding that the Tenth Amendment states the "truism"
that what is not surrendered is retained).
65 Whitman v American TruckingAssociations, Inc, 531 US 457,468 (2001).
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powers and then stopped. Stopping where they did is significant
because it represents the drafters' response to the question whether
the list is long enough. The fact that they said no more is much less
likely to have been an oversight considering their understanding of
the clause.
The clause thus locates the Constitution one step-but only one
step-beyond the Articles of Confederation when it comes to the
status of the enumeration. The Articles embraced a principle of strict
construction of power grants to the United States.6 The clause clarifies
that the Constitution does not contain this principle insofar as it
would bar incidental powers. But the principle must be limited to
incidental powers, because if it applied to more than that, it would
subvert the purpose of enumeration. The clause is the sort of thing
that drafters use when their confidence in their own foresight is
substantial but not complete, or, more specifically, when they think
they have sorted out the big issues to their own satisfaction and want
to make sure that strict construction does not interfere with sorting
out the details later.
So understood, the clause requires strong, though not absolute,
means-end connections between primary goals and secondary rules, a
conclusion consistent with Professor Miller's findings about the word
"necessary" in corporate charters (pp 149-54). That is because the
primary grants have both an affirmative and a limiting function, as their
boundaries are the boundaries of federal power, and those boundaries
are an important part of the scheme. With a strong causation
requirement, the enumerated powers operate in just that way, as their
substance determines their limits by dictating the content of ancillary
steps that Congress may take. The powers thus supply the principles of
limitation.
The authors' understanding of the clause also strongly suggests that
the side effect of expanding federal power, to use the terms I suggest
above, is important, and that the clause limits that effect. Again, this
follows from the way in which that reading underlines the importance of
the enumeration's limitations. The enumerated powers are to be primary
and their incidental implementations secondary with respect to the
extent of federal power. This indicates that two particular concepts that
Lawson and Seidman discuss-proportionality and least restrictive
means-match this reading of the clause well. If the bulk of the effects of
an ostensibly incidental rule are unrelated to the ostensible goal, then the

66 See Articles of Confederation Art II ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.").
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goal has lost its primacy. When that happens, the secondary rule is not
proportioned to the primary goal, precisely because so much of what it
does is unconnected to the goal. In such situations, it will often be the
case that some other secondary rule, with much more limited effects,
could have furthered the primary goal to the same extent. It is, for
example, almost certainly possible to limit disruption of interstate
commerce from strikes without comprehensively regulating labormanagement bargaining, and the effects of doing the latter extend well
beyond the freeing up of interstate commerce.
On one quite important point, the book does no more than
tantalize. This point is whether it is possible to say that some
implementing steps that Congress might take are impermissible
because they would involve the use of a power that is itself, in
Madison's words, "independent and substantive."6' An independent
and substantive power would be one that can be described clearly
enough so that it is possible to tell when Congress is using it, and that
is excluded by the expresio unius principle because it is so important
that the Federal Convention, or a hypothetical rational drafter, would
have included it if Congress had been meant to have it. Madison's
best-known example is the power to charter corporations, which was
at stake in the struggle to establish the Bank of the United States. The
power to issue corporate charters is such a central aspect of
sovereignty, he reasoned, that the drafters' decision not to explicitly
grant it must be tantamount to the decision to withhold it, and not
simply to leave open the question whether chartering is incidental to
some explicit power.
That reasoning is fine in form, as it is a sensible way of taking
seriously both presence and absence in the enumeration, but filling in
the substance is famously difficult. Especially considering the vast
array of purposes for which an entity might be created, that such an
entity can have a separate legal personality probably does not seem
like a huge matter to most people today. Early twenty-first-century
Americans are thus probably much in sympathy with Hamilton, who
67 Whether individual legislators must be sincere in their motivation, a question raised
above, is more difficult, and the content of the Necessary and Proper Clause may well have little
to do with it. The answer depends in large part on the analytical categories into which
constitutional provisions fall. The clause is primarily a grant of power, and as such prescribes no
duties for legislators with respect to their exercises, or attempted exercises, of those powers. It is
possible that the empowering provisions, or in my view more likely other aspects of the
Constitution, do impose some duties, including, for example, a duty to use (or seek to use) a
power in accordance with the purpose set out in the Constitution. This is a fundamental question,
but it is not specific to the Necessary and Proper Clause.
68 Madison, The Bank Bill, in Hobson, et al, 13 The Papers of James Madison 375-79 (cited
in note 28).
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said that the power to create a corporation was incidental, not
primary. He said that the reason Congress could not create a
corporation to handle safety and sanitation in Philadelphia was not
that it could not create corporations, but that it had no power
connected to keeping Philadelphia secure and clean.
Evidence about prior practice in fiduciary, administrative, or
corporate law is not likely to be of much use on this topic, because the
Constitution is such a different context. Congress is not a sovereign,
but a legislature, elected by the people and vested, for example, with
the awesome powers of war and taxation. A power that would be
independent and substantive in the hands of a trustee, or even a public
corporation or agency not directly representing the people, might be
incidental for a body that is authorized to appropriate the people's
revenue, spend it on a military force, and send that force to conquer
another country.
The difficulties in identifying independent and substantive
powers, the absence of which implies their unavailability to Congress,
are a serious obstacle to articulating the principle of enumerated
powers in a workable form. That point is highlighted by the Supreme
Court's current doctrine regarding § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the other enforcement powers attached to affirmative
limitations."o According to the Court, legislation to enforce the other
provisions of the Amendment must exhibit congruence with-and,
remarkably enough, proportionality to-that end." The Court in City
of Boerne v Flores72 prominently cited M'Culloch but did not connect
its test under § 5 to Chief Justice Marshall's descriptions of power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The implication is strong
that the requirement of congruence and proportionality is stronger
than that under the clause. Yet the enforcement provisions were
modeled on the earlier clause and have the same means-end structure.
What accounts for the difference?

69 Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, made that argument in his opinion, prepared at
President George Washington's direction, on the constitutionality of the First Bank of the United
States. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank
(1791), in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 8 The PapersofAlexander Hamilton 63, 100-01 (Columbia 1965).
70 All such powers appear in amendments. The fact that the original Constitution's
affirmative limitations and other non-power-granting provisions, like the Fugitive Slave Clause,
came with no explicit power to enforce them gave rise to a long and often bitter debate about
the presence or absence of such power. See generally, for example, Prigg v Pennsylvania,
41 US (16 Pet) 539 (1842). The enforcement powers in the amendments are in part a response to
that earlier uncertainty.
71
See City ofBoerne v Flores,521 US 507,519-20 (1997).
72 521 US 507 (1997).
73 See id at 516-29.
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One explanation is that the Court in City of Boerne was
protecting its own turf A power to enforce a constitutional limitation
can easily turn into a power to determine the content of the limitation,
and much of the case was devoted to the conclusion that Congress has
no power over the actual meaning of the amendment. Indeed, in
reaching that conclusion, the Court went so far as to disapprove a
74
The
long-bruited reading of its earlier case, Katzenbach v Morgan.
Court, a cynic might think, is more concerned about congressional
attempts to usurp the judicial power than congressional attempts to
exercise power retained by the states or the people." A more
charitable explanation is that the task under § 5 is easier than that
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, precisely because in the
former context there is a working definition of the independent and
substantive power that Congress does not have: the power to
determine the content of the amendment. To say that an exercise of
the § 5 power is proportioned to its permissible goal is in large part to
say that it does not amount to a redefinition of the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That negative reference point, usually absent
in Necessary and Proper Clause analysis, makes it possible to say
when the § 5 power has gone further than it should.
IV. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE IN LIGHT OF DIFFERENT
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES

The authors do not seek to defend a methodology, in part
because they do not agree on one, and hence do not offer any
conclusions about what anyone should do with the arguments that
they present about the original understanding (p 8). It is almost
inevitable to ask, if they are right, what that means. And on what
assumptions does one's answer to the preceding question depend?
According to one important theory of the American legal system,
the significance of the authors' claims is seriously limited because the
written Constitution, however its meaning is to be determined, is only
one component of the country's actual constitution. Professor Richard
Fallon is the most profound and explicit contemporary exponent of
76
this position. Drawing on H.L.A. Hart's understanding of law about
74 384 US 641 (1966). The Court in City of Boerne rejected the claim that Morgan
recognized "a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained" in § 1 of
the Amendment. City of Boerne,521 US at 527-28.
75 See City of Boerne, 521 US at 524 (discussing the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment
and concluding that "the power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in
the Judiciary").
76 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, ConstitutionalPrecedent Viewed through the Lens of Hartian
PositivistJurisprudence,86 NC L Rev 1107,1113 (2008):
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how legal systems work as a matter of fact, Fallon maintains that it is a
fact that American legal and governmental practice does not take the
written Constitution as its ultimate touchstone. The document is
important, to be sure, but it is only part of the story. There are
constitutional prohibitions and permissions that cannot be reconciled
with it and that have developed in the time since it was adopted. The
Supreme Court's doctrine is an especially important source and
indicator of the non-Constitution constitution, though it is not alone in
those functions.
If Hart is right, as I believe he is, and the content of legal rules is
ultimately a question of fact, whether Fallon is correct depends on the
hard factual question whether the basic rule of the American legal
system is simply to follow the written Constitution. I believe that the
written Constitution and only the written Constitution satisfies Hart's
criteria, but take this position with some hesitation, because whether it
does is not easy to determine. If Fallon is correct, and contraConstitution practice establishes other legal principles as
fundamental, then it is very likely that one such principle is that
federal power is not limited in the way a reasonable reader of the
Constitution would expect it to be. This is perhaps the most striking
way in which actual constitutional practice is difficult to reconcile with
the text. For someone who agrees with Fallon and adopts this
jurisprudential position, the authors' evidence will be unconvincing,
because the Necessary and Proper Clause is exactly the portion of the
written Constitution that has been superseded in actual legal practice.
Another standpoint from which the authors' evidence would be
of only limited importance retains the text as the only constitution
but understands it in a highly purposive way. If this way of thinking
about the Constitution is as common as I suspect, especially with
Constitutional originalists and textualists, who dislike this state of affairs [in which changing
judicial precedent changes the practical meaning of the Constitution], protest that the
meaning of the Constitution, as the fundamental law, is necessarily unchanging, and that the
practice of modem Justices, judges, and lawyers cannot legitimately alter it. As I have said,
many law students and concerned citizens assume intuitively that the originalists must be
correct in this jurisprudential premise. But arguments of this kind miss the point that it is
impossible to say what the fundamental law is except in reference to the practice of Justices,
judges, and other contemporary officials. To cite examples to which I shall refer often, it is
doubtful, at the very least, that the Constitution would originally have been understood to
permit Congress to establish a Social Security system or to authorize the printing of paper
money, rather than providing for coinage. Nevertheless, the Social Security system and
paper money are constitutionally valid today because they are recognized as such under
what H.L.A. Hart classically described as practice-based "rules of recognition" for
determining constitutional validity, and they would remain valid even if it could be
established decisively that they are incompatible with the original understanding.
For Hart's position, see generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 2d ed 1994).

2011]

Enumerated FederalPower

1129

respect to congressional power, then it is important to identify it in
describing interpretive positions for which the historical evidence
does and does not matter powerfully.
To see the nature and attraction of this interpretive stance, it is
useful to observe that although the book (and hence this Review) are
about the Necessary and Proper Clause, discussion of congressional
power over economic activity and decisions is routinely conducted in
terms of the Commerce Clause, full stop." Sticklers may respond that
the topic is really the Commerce Clause plus the Necessary and
Proper Clause, because, for example, production is not commerce,
and staying at a hotel while engaged in interstate commerce is not
itself interstate commerce. 9 A hyper-stickler, having read this book,
could answer that the stickler's point is just an artifact of the
particular drafting strategy of the Federal Convention, which could
have left incidental powers to implication by the main powers, in
which case the question really would always be what the main power
entails. But something more fundamental is going on, and the
tendency of the Necessary and Proper Clause to drop out of the
argument is an indicator of what that thing is.
A standard way of reconciling the broad current sweep of
congressional legislation with the Constitution's enumeration of
powers is to say that this is a situation in which an unchanged rule
produces quite different results because of changes in the world. The
relevant change in the world is the dramatically increased
interconnectedness of the economy, with, for example, many more
economic actors doing business in more than one state. In that form,
though, the argument is subject to the objection that the Constitution
does not give power over economic activity generally but over
particular forms of commerce. The conceptual distinction between
manufacturing (or agricultural production) and commerce is as
meaningful today as it was in 1787.
In order to support the extent of economic regulation in which
Congress now engages, an argument about an unchanged principle
applying to changed circumstances will work much better if the
unchanged principle is not limited to the text of the Constitution but
rather incorporates a purpose attributed to it. One standard
justification for including the interstate commerce power in the
77 See, for example, Lopez, 514 US at 552 ("On appeal, respondent challenged his
conviction based on his claim that [the Gun Free School Zones Act] exceeded Congress' power
to legislate under the Commerce Clause."); id at 556.
78 See Carter v CarterCoal Co, 298 US 238,303 (1936) ("Production is not commerce; but
a step in preparation for commerce.").
79 Consider Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379 US 241,258 (1964).
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enumeration is that if those decisions were left to the states, then they
would engage in individually rational, but collectively irrational,
protectionism, adopting regulations of trade that would help the
regulating state at the expense of others.io Understood more generally,
and without regard to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the purpose
of the Commerce Clause itself was to centralize economic regulatory
power in situations in which its dispersion would have adverse effects
for the country as a whole.
And that is the purpose of the vast bulk of economic regulation
found in current statutes, at least according to supporters of that
regulation. A pervasive rationale along these lines is that, left to
themselves, the states will engage in destructive competition, whether
it be with respect to the minimum working age or the minimum wage
or pollution control." Another is that efficiencies can be achieved by
having one set of rules and perhaps one agency of government to
administer them, as opposed to many.82 If the Commerce Clause is to
achieve its purpose, and that purpose is to give Congress the power
over economic affairs that a federal system needs, then much
legislation that has little or nothing to do with commerce narrowly
understood is nevertheless authorized by the clause-and that
legislation is a primary, not incidental, application of the power. An
interpreter who takes this approach to the text, regarding it as a
relatively rough marker for purposes that are the true law, will have

See Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1,224 (1824) (Johnson concurring):

8

For a century the States had submitted, with murmurs, to the commercial restrictions
imposed by the parent State; and now, finding themselves in the unlimited possession of
those powers over their own commerce, which they had so long been deprived of, and so
earnestly coveted, that selfish principle which, well controlled, is so salutary, and which,
unrestricted, is so unjust and tyrannical, guided by inexperience and jealousy, began to show
itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of
commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their
commercial interests abroad.
This was the immediate cause, that led to the forming of a convention.
According to the Court in United States v Darby,312 US 100 (1941), the purpose of the
Fair Labor Standards Act was
81

to exclude from interstate commerce goods produced for the commerce and to prevent
their production for interstate commerce, under conditions detrimental to the maintenance
of the minimum standards of living necessary for health and general well-being; and to
prevent the use of interstate commerce as the means of competition in the distribution of
goods so produced, and as the means of spreading and perpetuating such substandard labor
conditions among the workers of the several states.
Id at 109-10.
82
See Robert D. Cooter and Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism-A GeneralTheory
ofArticle I, Section 8,63 Stan L Rev 115,160 (2010).
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little concern with the Necessary and Proper Clause, and hence little
concern with the authors' findings.
It is important to see that the purposive argument just outlined is
originalist in form, because the purpose to which it appeals is that of
the Framers, or the ratifiers, or whatever actual or theoretical people
in the late eighteenth century are being treated as authoritative. To say
that the authoritative people, whoever they are, had no such purpose
is to argue over substance, not interpretive method. As students of
American constitutional history know, lots of purposes, goals, and
values, characterized at various levels of abstraction, can be attributed
to the Framers or their document. Some consider it a strength of a
purpose-based reading. Others consider it a weakness.
Just as purpose-based constitutionalism can be originalist, so, too,
the evidence presented in the book can be used by a nonoriginalist,
which is the strength that I have saved for now. Despite the fact that
the authors are talking about legal practices in the eighteenth century,
and hence about the actual historical background of the Constitution,
the relevance of their work is not so limited. I suggested above that
because the same solution -granting limited but unenumerated
incidental powers to an agent-appears in several legal settings, one
could reasonably conclude that the solution is generally applicable."
Although the legal settings that the authors describe are all from the
period shortly before the Framing, there is no indication that
eighteenth-century fiduciary law, for example, was anything other than
fiduciary law. The authors can thus plausibly be said to have identified
not a standard eighteenth-century solution to a recurring eighteenthcentury problem, but a standard reasonable solution to a recurring
problem in the drafting of legal instruments.
If that is so, then their findings should be of great interest to
anyone who wants to take the specifics of the text seriously, with or
without regard to the particular historical era in which it was adopted.
It is, after all, a constitution designed to endure for ages to come." Its
text therefore should reflect principles that are enduring, even if not
utterly timeless.

See Part III.A.
Chief Justice Marshall was discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the breadth
of Congress's discretion thereunder, when he wrote that "[t]his provision is made in a
constitution designed to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs." M'Culloch, 17 US (4 Wheat) at 415.
83
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